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Abstract 
Paramilitary organisations exerted a stranglehold on working class loyalist and republican 
communities in Northern Ireland during the conflict. In the absence of an effective and 
legitimate policing service, paramilitaries developed an alternative ‘justice’ system in which 
they ‘punished’ those accused of committing crimes against the community. They adopted a 
punitive system of control which included threats or warnings, public humiliation, curfew, 
exiling, beatings and shootings. This article traces the evolution of this system from illegal 
paramilitary ‘policing’ through to restorative justice schemes which, over time, have become 
a recognised part of the formal criminal justice system. Specifically it examines the role 
which a series of evaluations had on influencing this transformation. At the very least, policy 
evaluation informed the political debate and provided evidence to move restorative justice 
from illegal activities to an integral part of the criminal justice system. 
 
Introduction 
This paper traces how illegal practices of paramilitaries groups involved in ‘policing’ their 
own communities in Northern Ireland shifted to adopt restorative justice schemes operating in 
the twilight of the law which were subsequently incorporated into the formal criminal justice 
system. Specifically it will consider what role evaluations of these schemes played in 
community restorative justice moving from the margins to the mainstream of criminal justice 
policy. Three evaluations were conducted over a 10 year period: one by academics, one on 
behalf of funders (by Professor Harry Mika), and, through the independent statutory criminal 
justice inspectorate, respectively. The sequencing of the evaluations (see table 2 below) 
coincided with significant political developments in Northern Ireland: the Belfast (Good 
Friday) Agreement 1998; periodic suspension and restoration of the devolved Assembly 
(2000 through 2007); republican endorsement of the policing (2007); and, finally political 
stability and power sharing (2007 onwards). Evaluation research had the potential to impact 
either positively or negatively on the wider peace process. Indeed, evidence gathered through 
the evaluations featured equally in support of how political agreements reached were 
effective in embedding peace or proved that some political parties were disingenuous about 
their long term intentions. In short, the paper considers to what extent evaluations of 
restorative justice were an important evidential contribution element ofto the wider political 
discourse at a critical juncture in the Northern Ireland peace process. The paper is in three 
parts: first, the background to,  evolution of, the community informal ‘justice’ system and the 
transition into regulated restorative schemes; second, the detail of the evaluations which took 
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place and provided an evidence base for this transition; and third, the intersection of 
evaluation research and the ‘high politics’ of Northern Ireland. 
 
 
Background 
Northern Ireland has witnessed significant changes in its political, constitutional and security 
landscape since the beginning of the conflict in 1969. Political stability has created an 
environment where violence is seen by all but the extremists as redundant. The existing 
political arrangements are rooted in the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement 1998 that provided 
for, inter alia, a devolved Northern Ireland Assembly with full executive and legislative 
authority which has functioned continuously since 2007 after a series of faltering starts.   
Devolution wavered largely over decommissioning of paramilitary weapons. From its 
inception in December 1999 until October 2002, the Assembly was suspended four times. A 
political break-through came in the form of the St Andrews Agreement in October 2006.  
Following elections, devolved power was restored to the Assembly in May 2007 with a 
power-sharing Executive headed by Ian Paisley as the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) First 
Minister (now replaced by Peter Robinson) and Sinn Féin’s Martin McGuinness as Deputy 
First Minister.  A working system of local governance has been in place since 2007, 
described by the First Minister as the ‘most settled period of devolution for over forty years’ 
(Robinson, 2009: 4). An uninterrupted period of devolution, the transfer of policing and 
justice powers to the Northern Ireland Assembly from Westminster (the so-called final piece 
of the ‘devolution jigsaw’), and a move away from constitutional and security issues heralds 
a return to ‘normal’ politics. 
 
Yet political violence cannot be completely discounted even though it has significantly 
decreased. There is a small but significant level of violence perpetrated by paramilitary 
groups clinging to the vestiges of control in loyalist and republican working class areas. This 
community based violence is the focus of this paper. Such was the role played by 
paramilitaries throughout the conflict in ‘policing’ their communities that an ‘alternative 
criminal justice system’ emerged with its own brutal punitive system of punishing wrong-
doers or those accused of committing crimes against their own community.  
  
The evolution of community informal ‘justice’ 
Informal community ‘justice’ in contemporary Northern Ireland evolved in the early 1970s 
within Catholic working class communities where citizen defence committees were set up to 
protect Catholic enclaves from loyalist attacks. As the security forces (the then Royal Ulster 
Constabulary - RUC) withdrew from barricaded areas, local defence associations emerged to 
deal with petty crime within the community. Increasingly, paramilitary organisations became 
active in policing their own areas. Silke (1998: 124) described the spectrum of punitive 
actions or ‘punishment scale’ used. House or shop breakers were compelled to reimburse 
their victims and return stolen goods. In cases involving children, the IRA approached the 
parents and requested greater parental control. In situations where an alleged offender refused 
to co-operate or had ignored previous warnings, they were liable for ‘suitable punishment’. 
This usually involved shooting or beating the individual anywhere in the leg – so-called 
‘kneecapping’ (Republican News, 1971:2). For those ‘too young to be kneecapped’, 
‘punishments’ included curfew, tar and feathers, being tied up, publicly painted and 
reprimanding their parents (Republican News, 1982:1).  Individuals suspected of informing 
the police were dealt with most severely and their ‘punishment’ depended on the type of 
information passed to the security forces. In some cases they were knee-capped but usually 
they were shot dead.  In loyalist areas, paramilitaries from the early 1970s assumed a similar 
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policing role in their communities and used many of the methods adopted by republicans 
(Smithey, 2011). Although paramilitary groups claimed to carry out investigations into 
incidents before an individual was punished, effectively they ignored due process, and the 
human rights of the accused were practically non-existent.  Kennedy (1995:14) described the 
system as a barbaric range of punitive measures against individuals ‘who violated some 
community norm as defined by the paramilitary grouping’.  In short, the 1970s to mid 1990s 
period was characterised as wholly unofficial ‘policing’ of republican and loyalist 
communities by paramilitaries in de facto self-governing areas (Knox and Monaghan, 2002). 
 
Political progress and the paramilitary ceasefires in the mid 1990s caused a radical rethink of 
the informal ‘justice’ system. No longer could paramilitaries be involved in highly visible 
acts of violence, particularly against young people, and claim legitimacy in upholding 
ceasefires. As the political momentum accelerated in the form of the Belfast (Good Friday) 
Agreement 1998, pressure to loosen the grip of paramilitaries on communities increased. For 
example, the Agreement (1998, 1: 4) outlined its ‘opposition to any use or threat of force for 
any political purpose’. Alternative community ‘policing’ arrangements were therefore 
explored. In republican communities, the Northern Ireland Association for the Care and 
Rehabilitation of Offenders (NIACRO) approached Sinn Féin to investigate ways in which 
non-violent alternatives might be found to tackle community crime. The model which 
emerged was based on a system of community restorative justice developed in Canada and 
the United States in the early 1970s.  Community restorative justice has been defined as: 
 A more inclusive approach to dealing with the effects of the crime, which 
concentrates on restoring and repairing the relationship between the offender, the 
victim, and the community at large, and which typically includes reparative elements 
towards the victim and/or the community (Criminal Justice Review Group, 2000, 
para. 1) 
 
Loyalists developed a parallel scheme aimed at tackling anti-social behaviour. Both types of 
community restorative justice schemes, the loyalist Greater Shankill Alternatives Programme 
(NIA) and the republican Community Restorative Justice Scheme (CRJI) received support 
funding from Atlantic Philanthropies, an American charitable foundation. These 
unregulated community restorative justice schemes operated from the late 1990s 
onwards with some success according to those involved in their operation (Auld et al, 
1997; Winston and Watters, 2006).  
 
 
Regulating restorative justice  
 
The unregulated community restorative system described above came under both general and 
legal pressures to adopt government regulation - put starkly, reform or be marginalised. The 
Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement (1998:22) argued that the police service must be ‘capable 
of winning public confidence and acceptance, delivering a policing service in constructive 
and inclusive partnerships with the community at all levels, and with maximum delegation of 
authority and responsibility’. The follow-on political agreement at St Andrews (October 
2006) reasserted the need for accountable policing by arguing ‘we have consistently said that 
support for policing and the rule of law should be extended to every part of the community. 
We believe that all parties share this objective’ (Agreement at St Andrews, 2006: section 5).  
The lack of confidence in policing, particularly in working class areas of Northern Ireland, 
had been the raison d’être for a parallel (rather than complementary) system of restorative 
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justice. As confidence in the PSNI grew and the police gave their support to the principle of 
restorative justice, albeit with strict conditions, the pressure for change mounted.  
 
There were also legal pressures on the Government to regulate community restorative justice.  
The Human Rights Act 1998 was received with limited enthusiasm in Northern Ireland but 
the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement placed human rights at the centre of the political 
agenda. The Agreement went much further than the European Convention on Human Rights, 
recognising that Northern Ireland should be founded on the ‘principles of full respect for, and 
equality of, civil, political, social and cultural rights’, as well as ‘freedom from discrimination 
for all citizens’ (The Agreement, 1998 para. (v)). There followed two reports detailing how 
human rights should be implemented in practice.  The Patten Report (1999) on policing 
reforms and the Criminal Justice Review (2000) were extensive documents recognising past 
institutional failings and recommending how human rights in Northern Ireland might be 
better protected in the future. Even though these ‘additional’ measures were not strictly 
legally binding obligations, the introduction of human rights-friendly policies is both 
necessary and desirable to translate rhetorical respect into concrete observance (O’Cinneide, 
2006). However, it was these two reports (more so the latter) that really thrust community 
restorative justice onto the political agenda.   
 
The Protocol 
 
As a result of the recommendations from the Criminal Justice Review, the (then) Minister of 
State for the Northern Ireland Office, David Hanson, published (after two attempts at 
consultation) the Protocol for Community-based Restorative Justice Schemes (Northern 
Ireland Office, 2007). In launching the protocol the Minister emphasised that it contained 
stringent safeguards to protect the rights of both victim and offenders, and police would be at 
the centre of the process. He claimed it:  
put in place a structure which will provide for effective engagement between community-
based schemes and the criminal justice system in dealing with low level offending. The 
high standards set out in the protocol are non-negotiable’ (Hanson, 2007: 2).  
The protocol followed the precise headings of the Criminal Justice Review recommendations 
referred to above and included the following principles: 
 
 Schemes must recognise that statutory responsibility for the investigation of crime 
rests with the police and that the only forum which can determine guilt or innocence, 
where this is at issue, is a court of law… 
 This means that any group or structures organised by the community should include 
provision for full co-operation and communication with the police. 
(Northern Ireland Office, 2007) 
 
Not surprisingly, republican communities found this protocol totally unacceptable. The role 
of the police was central to reporting, investigating and applying sanctions at the community 
level. For republicans, at that time, this was simply unworkable. The police, on the other 
hand, argued that they needed to know the nature of the crime, who the offender is, and that 
(s)he is being dealt with by the scheme. If not, the offender is left open to double jeopardy. 
Acutely aware, however, of the need to satisfy standards by which its schemes should 
operate, republicans (drawing on previous research) developed their own code of practice, 
setting standards  pertaining to participants, the community, and outlining fundamental 
concepts of restorative justice, without reference to the police in their documentation 
(Community Restorative Justice, 1999). The Northern Ireland Office protocol included an 
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accreditation process whereby each community-based restorative justice scheme had to 
confirm to the Criminal Justice Inspection (CJI), an independent statutory body with 
responsibility for inspecting all aspects of the criminal justice system in Northern Ireland 
(apart from the judiciary), its willingness to adhere to the protocol. If, after inspection, the 
Inspectorate was satisfied that the standards set out in the protocol were being met, the 
scheme became accredited by the Northern Ireland Office. Schemes which received 
accreditation became eligible for government resources (the carrot); those schemes 
which did not apply or were turned down did not receive government funding nor 
engage formally with the criminal justice system (the stick). The latter could continue 
with their unregulated work and, providing they did nothing illegal, the Government was in 
no position to discontinue their work.   
  
From the margins to the mainstream 
 
The loyalist Northern Ireland Alternatives and its four restorative schemes were the subject 
of an inspection with a view to accreditation from the Criminal Justice Inspectorate Northern 
Ireland in April 2007. The report noted the role played by the schemes in reducing 
‘punishment’ beatings by offering alternative means of dealing with low-level offending: ‘the 
schemes… first and foremost are a community resource dedicated to working with difficult 
youngsters, either diverting them away from crime in the first place or helping them to draw 
them out of criminal and anti-social behaviour..’ (Criminal Justice Inspection, 2007a: 18, 
3.6).   
   
The report concluded that the loyalist schemes ‘worked to a high standard with difficult 
young people in their communities’ and recommended that Northern Ireland Alternatives be 
accredited, subject to agreement on conditions identified by the Inspection team. The first 
schemes to be accredited were: the loyalist Northern Ireland Alternatives, Greater Shankill 
Alternatives, East Belfast Alternatives, and North Belfast Alternatives. 
 
In October 2007, Criminal Justice Inspection completed a pre-inspection report of republican 
schemes in Belfast and Derry/Londonderry which operate under the auspices of Community 
Restorative Justice Ireland (CRJI), the first stage of the accreditation process. Their 
involvement in this initial process was significant and was helped by the fact that in January 
2007 Sinn Féin publicly recognised the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). The report 
covered two sets of CRJI schemes – four in Derry and four in West Belfast and essentially 
described the state of readiness of the schemes for accreditation. The inspectors 
concluded:’the fact that, for historical reasons, the schemes do not normally pass information 
to the police means that they are not at present operating in accordance with the Protocol. 
(Criminal Justice Inspection, 2007b: 31, 5.2). The report recommended that the CRJI 
schemes should be considered for accreditation as soon as they were ready to declare that 
they were complying with the Protocol, and set out several suggestions as to how they might 
do this.  
 
In June 2008 the Criminal Justice Inspectorate re-inspected the republican restorative justice 
schemes and based on a balance between ‘risks and opportunities involved’, they confirmed 
accreditation (Criminal Justice Inspection Northern Ireland, 2008: 13). The risks were of the 
schemes behaving improperly, and the opportunities were establishing a proper relationship 
with the police and helping them to reach out to communities which were alienated and 
poorly served. In accrediting the schemes the Inspectorate noted that they needed to be 
closely monitored and a fully independent complaints mechanism put in place. In a follow-up 
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report conducted by the Inspectorate in 2011, CRJI was criticised for their complaints policy 
and not meeting the threshold for inclusion under the Government’s Protocol for community-
based restorative justice. However, the report concluded that: 
  
The schemes are increasingly assuming a role where they are attempting to influence 
dissident republican paramilitaries and other armed groups away from intimidation, 
expulsions and violence. This work is valued particularly by the police, local 
community and some political leadership and is seen as an important element in 
ensuring that these events do not become commonplace (Criminal Justice Inspection, 
2011: 19, 5.7). 
 
The transformative nature of the fully accredited schemes operated through CRJI and 
NIA is now recognised by most statutory agencies on the ground. The schemes are 
involved in the delivery of services ranging from community and mediation support, 
counselling and youth work, to interventions in cases of anti-social behaviour and those 
‘under threat’. The schemes receive financial support from a range of statutory and 
philanthropic funders, all of which express a high level of satisfaction with the services they 
provide (Knox, 2011). The statutory organisations include: the Department of Justice, 
Department for Social Development, Probation Board for Northern Ireland, PSNI, Northern 
Ireland Housing Executive, and the Belfast Health Trust. 
 
This paper  summarises the key stages in the transition of restorative justice schemes from the 
margins to the mainstream in table 1 below.  
 
Table 1: Community-based restorative justice schemes – the transition 
  
Informal ‘Justice’ 
 
[1970 – mid 1990s] 
Unregulated 
Community Restorative 
Justice 
[1994 – 2006] 
Regulated Community Restorative 
Justice 
[2007 onwards] 
 Absence of 
legitimate 
policing service in 
loyalist and 
republican areas 
 Paramilitary 
organisations 
‘police’ their own 
communities 
 Tariff system of 
‘punishment’ 
operates 
 Due process 
ignored and no 
protection for 
rights of alleged 
perpetrators 
 Non-violent 
alternative schemes 
set up: Northern 
Ireland Alternatives 
(loyalist) and 
Community 
Restorative Justice 
(republican) 
 Schemes operate 
outside 
government/police 
control 
 Loyalists ‘co-operate’ 
with police; 
republicans eschew 
RUC/PSNI 
 Schemes funded by 
philanthropic sources 
 Government produces protocol 
(2007) to accredit community based 
schemes 
 New regulated schemes can deal 
only with low level offences referred 
to them by Public Prosecution 
Service 
 Schemes required to operate in 
accordance with the Human Rights 
Act 1998 & UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child in their 
interaction with young victims and 
offenders. 
 NIA and CRJI receive accreditation 
(2007 and 2008, respectively) from 
Criminal Justice Inspection. 
 Schemes provide restorative services 
to a range of statutory organisations 
 
Evaluation of the schemes 
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Given the journey of the restorative justice schemes, from operating as illegal activities 
directed by paramilitaries to becoming an integral element in the formal criminal justice 
system, a key question in this paper is the extent to which formal evaluation and evidence 
therein played a part in this process. Evaluation research, according to Rossi and Freeman 
(1993: 5), is ‘the systematic application of social research procedures for assessing the 
conceptualisation, design, implementation and utility of social intervention programs.’ There 
were three evaluations conducted during the transition from illegal practices to mainstream 
restorative justice which were very different in focus and type. The first evaluation, using 
taxonomy developed by Patton, might be described as a responsive evaluation which sought 
to capture, represent and interpret varying perspectives, in particular why communities 
‘accepted’ domination by paramilitary groups and why government was prepared to turn ‘a 
blind eye’ to this practice (Patton, 2008; Stake and Abma, 2005). The second evaluation can 
be understood as an impact evaluation which considered the outcomes of community 
restorative models on victims and perpetrators and whether this type of intervention was an 
effective way of tackling low level crime and anti-social behaviour. The third evaluation is 
depicted as having a compliance focus – were restorative justice schemes acting in 
accordance with human rights principles and criminal justice protocol arrangements? We 
now consider each of these in some detail.  
 
Academic research (responsive evaluation) 
The first project, entitled An Evaluation of the Alternative Criminal Justice System in 
Northern Ireland, was conducted by academics and funded by the respected and independent 
Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) in the UK.  The overall aim of the research 
was to contribute to an understanding of increasing paramilitary influence in ‘policing’ the 
two communities in Northern Ireland and the concomitant threat to social stability. The 
research took place from 1998 – 2000 and involved significant primary data collection – 42 
interviews with victims, 2 with perpetrators, 6 focus groups with key stakeholders including 
the police and probation services, 12 politicians and 80 statutory and voluntary/NGO 
organisations in Northern Ireland. In addition, 2 large excel databases of reported 
paramilitary-style attacks were constructed and GIS maps of locations drawn.  
 
The timing of the evaluation is significant because it straddled important political events. The 
Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement was signed on 10
th
 April 1998 following which power was 
devolved from Westminster to the Northern Ireland Assembly on 2
nd
 December 1999. During 
the negotiations in the run up to the Agreement all parties involved had to endorse  the 
Mitchell principles of democracy and non-violence. One principle urged that ‘punishment’ 
killings and beatings stop and parties take effective steps to prevent such actions.  The 
negotiators noted: ‘We join the governments, religious leaders and many others in 
condemning ‘punishment’ killings and beatings.’ (Mitchell, de Chastelain and Holkeri, 1996: 
paragraph 20). 
 
The outcome of the multi-party talks was the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement 1998 in 
which all participants reaffirmed their ‘total and absolute commitment to exclusively 
democratic and peaceful means of resolving differences on political issues, and our 
opposition to any threat of force by others for any political purpose’ (Belfast [Good Friday] 
Agreement: section 4:1, 1998). Over nineteen months later, in advance of devolution, Sinn 
Féin stated the importance of the political process in making conflict a thing of the past and 
emphasised their opposition to the use of force and ‘punishment’ attacks (Sinn Féin 
statement: 16 November 1999).  
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The findings of the evaluation were damning in the extreme. The researchers found that 
victims of paramilitary ‘punishment’ beatings and shootings had become expendable and 
legitimate targets for violence in Northern Ireland. They were expendable in the sense that 
any attempt to deal with this problem in a serious way would have widespread political 
ramifications for parties currently in devolved government. The Mitchell principles of 
‘democracy and non-violence’ which were pivotal to the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement 
could not be upheld. It appears that it was political expedient to turn a blind eye to these acts 
of brutality. They were legitimate in the sense that the victims’ culpability derived from the 
communities within which they lived and their ‘punishment’ was meted out by paramilitaries 
acting on the communities’ behalf. Both these factors conspired to make this group not only 
the forgotten victims of violence in Northern Ireland, but arguably the most vulnerable. The 
researchers described this as a ‘see no evil, hear no evil’ reaction on the part of the British 
Government given the fragility of the peace process (Knox, 2002). The Government’s 
response was that one must accept certain violent excesses in the interests of moving forward 
politically. This justification appears in the lexicon of political debate on Northern Ireland at 
the time. The former Secretary of State (Mo Mowlam, 1999: 2) suggested ‘the peace we 
have now is imperfect, but better than none’ or perhaps, more tersely, as having ‘an 
acceptable level of violence’.   
 
The research also became the subject of two parliamentary debates. In the House of 
Commons the Conservative Party attempted to halt the early release of political prisoners 
under the terms of the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement because of continuing paramilitary-
style shootings and beatings (Hansard, Official Report, 1999). In a Northern Ireland 
Assembly debate, pro- and anti-Agreement politicians adopted contrasting positions on the 
ESRC evaluation findings. One pro-Agreement party argued that the report ‘highlighted the 
strong support that there is for alternatives to ‘punishment’ attacks (such as restorative 
justice) in the absence of a legitimate policing service’ (Gildernew, 2001:361). Anti-
Agreement parties claimed that paramilitary attacks had soared as a direct result of prisoner 
releases and the research ‘presented cogent evidence that the Good Friday Agreement is 
failing’ (Paisley, 2001: 366).  Politicisation was an ongoing feature of the debate on the issue. 
The (then) Sinn Féin Health Minister, Bairbre de Brun, was regularly asked for information 
in the Northern Ireland Assembly on how the immediate hospitalisation of those subject to 
beatings and shootings was displacing patients on long waiting lists in need of orthopaedic 
surgery and trauma counselling (Hansard, Official Report, 2001). This was as much intended 
to embarrass and undermine the Sinn Féin Minister as it was to highlight the plight of 
paramilitary victims. 
 
 
The Funder’s evaluation (impact evaluation) 
The second evaluation was commissioned by the external funder (Atlantic Philanthropies) of 
the restorative justice schemes, Northern Ireland Alternatives and Community Restorative 
Justice Ireland. It was conducted by Professor Harry Mika, an international expert on 
restorative justice, from Central Michigan University, USA and the Institute of Criminology 
and Criminal Justice in Queen’s University, Belfast. Mika’s primary research involved the 
analysis of 500 formal case interventions and ‘several hundred interviews’ over the period 
between 1999 and 2005. 
The findings of the evaluation concluded, inter alia, the following: 
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 The restorative justice programmes prevented nearly 500 cases of paramilitary 
beatings and shootings. NIA and CRJI caused a significant drop in the number of 
beatings and shootings compared to neighbourhood areas outside their catchment 
population. 
 The acceptance of community restorative justice solutions by armed groups increased 
significantly. 
 Community leaders felt that the projects had become essential community assets. 
 Potential limitations of NIA and CRJI were caused by: perceived paramilitary links, 
political criticism, inadequate resourcing and increasing demands for their services 
(Mika, 2007: 33-34).  
 
Mika’s evaluation was a very strong endorsement of the community restorative justice 
schemes and also coincided with a series of political events which created the context for a 
more receptive response than the ESRC evaluation. The Northern Ireland Assembly had been 
faltering since its inception in 1999 and was dissolved by the British Government in October 
2002.  The two issues of central concern which formed the basis of talks to achieve 
restoration of the political institutions were: the need to support policing and the rule of law 
across the whole community and eventually the devolution of policing and justice, and 
support for power-sharing and the political institutions. The British and Irish Government 
reached agreement on these issues as set out in the St Andrews Agreement of 13
th
 October 
2006, the details of which were given legislative effect in the Northern Ireland (St Andrews 
Agreement) Act 2006. The Act made provisions for a new transitional Assembly, set out a 
timetable to restore devolution, the date for the third election to the Northern Ireland 
Assembly, and made important amendments to the Northern Ireland Act 1998 which came 
into force with the restoration of devolved government on 8
th
 May 2007. Ian Paisley (then 
DUP leader) and Gerry Adams (the leader of Sinn Féin) agreed to establish a power sharing 
Executive which has been in operation since then. Very quickly thereafter Sinn Féin joined 
the Northern Ireland Policing Board (June 2007) for the first time since it was established in 
2001. The role of the board is to hold the PSNI to account through the Chief Constable for 
the delivery of effective and impartial policing. 
 
Sinn Féin’s members had backed their leadership’s proposal to get involved in policing on 
the condition that a power sharing Executive was established. With power sharing in place 
and Sinn Féin participating in the Policing Board, there was no reason why restorative justice 
schemes in republican areas should not be co-operating fully with the PSNI, one of the key 
stumbling blocks to the accreditation process. The political choreography continued when 
Community Restorative Justice Ireland wrote to the Minister of State for Northern Ireland in 
February 2007 seeking accreditation in respect of their restorative justice schemes in Belfast 
and Derry/Londonderry. In short, Mika’s evaluation findings coincided precisely at a time 
when political developments were wholly positive towards a response to republican overtures 
on policing and security, including their role in restorative justice schemes. The 
accreditation process by the Criminal Justice Inspection was to copper-fasten 
republican commitments to community restorative justice. 
 
Criminal Justice Inspection reports (compliance evaluation) 
 
The inspection reports of the Criminal Justice Inspection Northern Ireland were key 
documents in moving restorative justice schemes from the margins to the mainstream of the 
criminal justice system. The loyalist Northern Ireland Alternatives schemes were quick to 
avail of the opportunity to achieve formal accreditation given their ongoing co-operation with 
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the PSNI and sought an inspection in March 2007. The methodology used by the inspectors 
was to gather both primary and secondary research data. They read extensive documentation: 
case files, policy documents, training materials, management committee minutes and annual 
reports and accounts. They also interviewed staff and volunteers, clients of the schemes (both 
young offenders and victims), parents of the children participating in the schemes and a wide 
range of other interested parties, including local politicians, PSNI officers, Probation officers 
and school teachers with experience of working with the schemes. 
 
Fears that community-based restorative justice schemes were a front for paramilitary 
organisations or that people were forced into taking part in restorative justice by 
paramilitaries were addressed in the course of the inspections by CJI. The inspectors found 
no evidence that there was any such problem in relation to Northern Ireland Alternatives or 
its schemes. In addition, there was no evidence of the schemes being driven by paramilitaries 
and every indication to the contrary. The report concluded that Alternatives ‘did not provide 
an alternative policing or judicial system. Most of the work undertaken by the schemes 
relates to community development’ (Criminal Justice Inspection, 2007a). The inspectors 
supported accreditation. A follow-up report was conducted by CJI in February 2010 and 
endorsed the earlier positive evaluation. The inspectors concluded that they ‘had heard 
unanimous support for the work of NIA and the contribution the organisation was making in 
helping the lives of people living within some of the most socially deprived loyalist areas of 
Greater Belfast and North Down’. As a result of NIA’s willingness to engage with statutory 
agencies they had earned ‘real respect and a desire to increase the level of partnership 
working’ (Criminal Justice Inspection, 2010: 14). 
 
Republican restorative schemes have struggled with the accreditation process and failed to 
achieve the same recognition as Northern Ireland Alternatives. A pre-inspection report 
conducted by CJI in May 2007 found that although the republican schemes were engaged in 
work that was valued by their communities, there were improvements that needed to be made 
before the schemes would be ready for accreditation (e.g. staff training to work to the 
standard required by the Protocol and to improve their record-keeping and the secure 
storage of files). A further inspection took place in June 2008 to determine Community 
Restorative Justice Ireland’s accreditation status. The inspectors found that the schemes were 
operating lawfully and non-coercively, were respecting human rights, and were beginning to 
develop a constructive relationship with the PSNI.  All 10 schemes operated by CRJI were 
accredited as a result (July 2008). However, in a follow-up inspection involving an 
examination of case files, CJI found that since securing accreditation, only one case had been 
referred by CRJI to the PSNI under the Government Protocol which highlighted a need for 
the current Protocol to be reviewed. Despite this, the inspectors found a number of positive 
developments had occurred in the three years since its previous inspection. ‘CRJI has become 
an important part of the voluntary and community sector landscape in parts of Northern 
Ireland and are integrating their activities as part of local community safety networks’ 
(Criminal Justice Inspection, 2011:13).  
 
Conclusions 
It is clear that the political context in Northern Ireland has improved significantly and, with 
that, restorative justice schemes have moved from their original mission of providing an 
alternative option for young people who ‘came to the attention’ of paramilitaries because of 
anti-social behaviour. Schemes now work in partnership with many statutory organisations 
using their restorative practice skills in other public policy areas where mediation is required 
(e.g. education and neighbourhood disputes). What is also clear is that as political stability 
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has become embedded, mutilations, torture, beatings and exiling can no longer come 
within the purview of an ‘acceptable level of violence’ or be seen as part of the 
imperfections of the peace process. The inspections/evaluations conducted by Criminal 
Justice Inspection have played an important part in ‘normalising’ restorative justice schemes. 
The ‘risks and opportunities’ calculus which they use – schemes breaching human rights of 
offenders versus the potential for republicans and loyalists to work in partnership with the 
police, has paid off. All three evaluations demonstrate the inextricable link between the 
changing political context and efforts to mainstream community restorative justice. Evidence 
from the ESRC evaluation became part of the vitriolic pro- and anti-Agreement debate. 
Mika’s evaluation coincided with a period of political consensus on policing and power 
sharing. And the Criminal Justice Inspection reports ushered restorative justice schemes from 
the margins into mainstream criminal justice policy. However, the direction of the influence 
is unclear here. Did the evaluations offer valuable empirical evidence at critical junctures in 
the political process, or did improving peace-building efforts allow a much more conducive 
environment in which restorative schemes flourished?   
 
There is also the question as to whether the nature of the evaluations was important to the 
influence which they had? The ESRC study or responsive evaluation (to return to Patton’s 
taxonomy above) conducted by academics presented independent evidence regardless of its 
impact on the fragile political environment. This evaluation offered an in-depth analysis of 
key stakeholders in the process – paramilitaries, police, victims, and government. It 
challenged the NI Secretary of State to confront the contradictions of an ‘acceptable level of 
violence’. The potential impact of this evaluation was limited by the politicisation of its 
findings but it provided important evidence as to why communities ‘accepted’ paramilitaries 
as guarantors of local justice. The funders’ or impact evaluation (in Patton’s terms) was 
straightforwardly an attempt to assess whether externally supported interventions were an 
effective alternative way of dealing with a repressive ‘justice’ regime. The strength of this 
study was the duration of the research which allowed evaluators to capture change over time 
and affirm NGOs as recognised mediators in the restorative process. Its findings were timely 
in that they coincided with a period when working with the police became consistent with the 
wider republican political agenda. In other words, there is evidence that restorative justice 
works and the question became how best to mainstream an externally funded intervention. 
The Criminal Justice Inspection reports or compliance evaluation (in Patton’s taxonomy) 
became a passport to government funding and legitimacy with other statutory organisations 
because they offered evidence of restorative justice schemes complying with international 
human rights standards which respected due legal process and the rights of the victims and 
perpetrators. Given the source of these reports and the weight which they carried as a 
consequence, it seems likely that they were pivotal to the success of incorporating restorative 
justice as part of the formal criminal justice system. Collectively, therefore, evaluation 
research: shone a light on the illegal activities of paramilitaries in ‘policing’ their 
communities and the acquiescence of the police and government in this process; 
provided evidence of an effective alternative administered through local NGOs with 
experience in restorative justice; and, demonstrated how restorative schemes could 
provide services which were fully-compliant with the law and human rights standards. 
We summarise the three evaluations of restorative justice schemes in Northern Ireland and 
their intersection with the ‘high politics’ of Northern Ireland in table 2. 
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Table 2: The intersection of evaluation and political context 
 
Evaluation of restorative justice in 
Northern Ireland 
Political context 
Funder: Economic and Research Council 
(ESRC) 
 
Dates: 1998-2000 
 
Methods: Interviews with victims, 
perpetrators, politicians, NGOs, police, 
probation board. Construction of data base to 
understand nature and incidence of beatings 
and shootings 
 Fragile political talks leading up to the 
Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement. 
 Involvement in paramilitary-style attacks 
could have excluded loyalist and 
republican parties from peace talks and 
political agreement. 
 British Government adopts ‘see no evil, 
hear no evil’ approach to community 
violence – bigger prize stance. 
Funder: Atlantic Philanthropies (external 
funder of restorative justice interventions) 
 
Dates: 1999-2005. Evaluation published 
January  2007 
 
Methods: Extensive review of case files, 
large number of interviews with key 
stakeholders, and non-participant observation 
techniques. 
 Devolved government in place since 
1999, although ongoing suspensions of 
the institutions. 
 St Andrews Agreement (2006) secures 
Sinn Féin support for policing and 
political deal on power-sharing 
arrangements. 
 Wider political imprimatur allows 
republican restorative justice schemes to 
work with police. 
Funder: Criminal Justice Inspection – non-
departmental public body and independent 
statutory inspectorate funded from the public 
purse (formerly located in the Northern 
Ireland Office and now in the devolved 
Department of Justice). 
 
Dates: 2007 - onwards 
 
Methods: Evaluation inspections and follow-
up reports using case files, organisational 
documentation, and extensive interviews 
with key stakeholders 
 Much improved political milieu – power 
sharing Executive and Assembly fully 
operational. 
 Active encouragement by Criminal 
Justice Inspection for restorative justice 
schemes to adopt protocol principles. 
 Restorative justice schemes refocus their 
work towards community mediation with 
a large number of statutory organisations. 
 Restorative justice mainstreamed and an 
integral part of formal criminal justice 
system. 
 
Can we be definitive about the impact of restorative justice schemes? Looking at the statistics 
since 1982 categorised as paramilitary-style shootings and beatings, some patterns emerge. 
Figure 1 shows the combined figures for beatings and shootings by republican and loyalist 
paramilitaries over time (PSNI, 2012).   
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The paramilitary cease-fires of August and October 1994 witnessed a significant decrease in 
the number shootings to the lowest recorded level, but beatings simultaneously increased to 
their highest recorded level, hence the spike in figure 1. This was a technical cop-out by 
paramilitaries who could claim they were not breaking the conditions of the cease-fires – 
instead of shooting those involved in anti-social behaviour, they beat them. The introduction 
of restorative justice programmes seemed to have had a short term effect on the overall level 
of paramilitary attacks but numbers increased to the highest recorded levels in 2001. During 
that period, wider political developments in the peace process were in trouble. The Northern 
Ireland Assembly was indefinitely suspended in October 2002 for the fourth time since 
devolution (December 1999) due to ‘a lack of trust and loss of confidence on both sides of 
the community’ according to the Secretary of State (Reid, 2002: 201). This stemmed from 
concerns about Sinn Féin’s commitment to exclusively democratic and non-violent means 
and accusations by each community of the other that they did not endorse the full operation 
and implementation of the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement. A climate of mistrust and 
uncertainty prevailed accentuated by events such as the trial of republicans in Colombia 
(allegedly involved in training the left-wing FARC group, Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia), but subsequently found not guilty), the break-in at Special Branch offices in 
Castlereagh Police Station (where personal details of Special Branch detectives were 
removed), and political espionage at Stormont implicating Sinn Féin. In the latter, unionists 
accused the IRA of exploiting Sinn Féin's membership of the Executive to gather information 
(names and addresses of prison officers) of use in future acts of violence. Since then, the 
trend has been downwards although the problem has not been eradicated because loyalist 
paramilitaries now involved in drug-dealing resort to their old punitive tactics.   
 
Have the restorative justice schemes contributed to the downward trend in paramilitary-style 
attacks? There are limitations in assessing impact through examining the statistics, not least 
because of our inability to isolate cause and effect variables in the restorative justice schemes 
and establishing the counterfactual position – in the absence of the schemes, beatings and 
shootings could have been a lot higher. The level of ‘punishment’ attacks may have little to 
do with what happens within the restorative schemes but influenced by extraneous factors 
over which they have no control. The loyalist turf feud between factional paramilitary groups 
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in the Shankill (Belfast) in 2000, for example, probably resulted in a number of 
‘housekeeping’ attacks by paramilitaries. Developments in the wider political landscape such 
as police reforms and the changes in the criminal justice system have impacted on the 
continuance or otherwise of ‘punishment’ attacks. It is also unrealistic to expect restorative 
justice schemes in isolation to tackle the systemic causes of anti-social behaviour: poverty, 
unemployment, urban decay and the wider social, political and economic milieu in which 
community violence exists. Disentangling the evidence emerging from evaluations of 
restorative justice schemes in a context of significant political reform is problematic. 
Proving a cause and effect relationship on declining paramilitary-style attacks is equally 
difficult. At the very least, policy evaluations of the schemes informed the political debate 
and, by design or default, provided timely evidence which helped to move restorative justice 
from illegal activities which paramilitaries used to exert control in working class 
communities to an integral part of the criminal justice system. 
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